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Abstract 
 Legal scholars and other social scientists agree that political violence 
comprising assaults on civil and political liberties may occur in the context of 
contentious politics. Unfortunately, there have been instances in history 
where such politics is marked by intermittent attacks against people's rights 
and freedoms. Such attacks occur when politics has gone sour, and there 
are times when the violence exceeds the bounds of what is acceptable. From 
the documented atrocities of Nazi Germany, the horrendous crimes of the 
regime of Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia, the outrageous 
crimes perpetrated during the genocide in Rwanda, the shameful and 
despicable inhumanities inflicted on the people of Darfur in the Sudan, and 
the violence in post-electoral Kenya, to the bloodshed in areas like Mali, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, etc, violent 
conflict has punctuated world history. Added to this list of countries is 
Cameroon, which in the last quarter of 2016 degenerated into a hotspot of 
political violence in the English-speaking regions. The perpetration of political 
violence in Cameroon has raised serious questions that may be relevant not 
only to the resolution of the political problem that gave rise to the violence 
but also to laying the foundations of a post-conflict Cameroon that is united 
and honours the principles of truth, justice and reconciliation. 
This paper describes some of the salient occurrences of political violence in 
Cameroon and argues that the presence of specific elements elevates this 
violence to the level of a serious crime in international law. It is argued herein 
that crimes against humanity may have been committed during the state 
action against the Anglophones in Cameroon. It is also argued that the 
political character of the violence, added to the scale of the victimisation and 
its systematic and protracted nature, qualify Cameroon as a transitional 
society engaged in conflict that is in need of transitional justice. 
Reflecting on the extent of the suffering of the victims of such political 
violence, this paper discusses the function of the justice system in 
establishing the truth and holding the perpetrators accountable. Past 
instances of political violence in Cameroon have been glossed over, but in 
our opinion, healing a fragmented and disunited Cameroon with its history of 
grave violations of human rights requires that the perpetrators be held 
accountable, and that truth and justice should prevail. Such considerations 
should be factored into the legal and political architecture of a post-conflict, 
transitional Cameroon. 
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1 Introduction 
Many scholars from different backgrounds share a consensus on what 
constitutes political violence and makes it sui generis different from other kinds 
of social violence. In the wake of demands for democratic reforms in Africa in 
the early 1990s, national dialogue was replaced by political violence, which 
quickly led to the use of force by dictatorial rulers to silence political dissent. 
Some of these conflicts became protracted as the scale of the action 
increased. Common to these political conflicts in many different parts of Africa 
was the impunity of those who were in power at the time. There was no 
accountability for their violations of human rights. The violence of their reaction 
to protest was compounded by the weak judicial systems in those states and 
other unfortunate socio-economic dynamics. The hapless victims of the 
violence were forced to accommodate and endure without remedy the 
injustices that were perpetrated against them, as the system afforded no legal 
avenues for redress. 
Some key questions are raised in response to the consideration of this 
repeated pattern of events. First, could such actions be classified as "most 
serious crimes of international concern" and thus become subject to the ICC?1 
These could be crimes against humanity, genocide, and/or war crimes. 
Second, could the political conflict be of a scale or nature that might warrant 
its being labelled a conflict in a transitional society?2 Third, what role could 
justice play in confronting and punishing such crimes, ending the culture of 
impunity, and fostering truth and reconciliation as the pillars upon which a 
peaceful and united post-conflict society could be built?3 Political 
                                            
  Avitus A Agbor. LLB (Hons) (Buea) LLM (Notre Dame, USA) PhD (Wits). Research 
Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, North-West University, South Africa. E-
mail: Avitus.Agbor@nwu.ac.za. Gratitude is expressed and extended to the National 
Research Foundation (NRF) for the (incentive) funding they provided that enabled me 
prosecute and complete this research. 
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Research Fellow, South African Research Chair in International Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of Johannesburg, South Africa. E-mail: esthere@uj.ac.za. 
1  This is the phrase that is used in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
see the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) (hereinafter referred to 
as the Rome Statute of the ICC), Art 1; Art 5 of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides 
that the jurisdiction of the ICC shall be "limited to the most serious crimes of international 
concern to the international community as a whole…". Also see Obura "Duty to 
Prosecute International Crimes" 12-13. 
2  See generally Mobekk "Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies" 261-292. 
3  For a discussion on the role of justice in post-conflict/transitional societies, see the 
following contemporary works: Quinn Reconciliation(s); Laplante 2009 Va J Int'l L 915-
984; Teitel 2003 Harv Hum Rts J 69-94; McEvoy 2007 J Law Soc 411-440; Mendez 
2001 Ethics & Int'l Affairs 25-44; Dwyer "Reconciliation for Realists" 91-110; Jenkins 
"Amnesty for Gross Violations of Human Rights" 19-20; Correa 1991-1992 Notre Dame 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  3 
developments in Cameroon since the last quarter of 2016 may offer us the 
opportunity to find answers to some of these questions. In that period the 
"Anglophone problem" has been a constant source of conflict.4 Systemic 
discrimination has been perpetrated against Anglophones (in terms of their 
identity, culture, institutions and recognition as equal human beings) in every 
sphere of Cameroonian life, especially in the political, cultural and economic 
domains.5 The problem, which has recently been exacerbated, has been in 
existence (without official acknowledgement) since at least 1961, when the 
negotiations for a Federal Cameroon were conducted and concluded in 
Foumban.6 English-speaking Cameroonians residing in the two English-
speaking regions have since then been subject to constant attacks on their 
civil and political liberties7 and also to other forms of assault, some of which 
are referenced in this paper. Unfortunately political violence is not new in 
Cameroon. Traversing the pages of history, this paper recounts some of the 
previous instances of egregious political violence. However, it is argued that 
the current spate of atrocities being committed in the English-speaking regions 
is unprecedented and sui generis: firstly, in terms of their scale; secondly, 
because of the organised nature of the atrocities; and thirdly, because they are 
directed against a protected group of people (an ethnic group). It is argued on 
this basis that what is transpiring in Cameroon exceeds the bounds of normally 
acceptable political violence. In fact, the existence of these elements suggests 
that serious crimes in international law may have been and are being 
committed in Cameroon. For a country that has had a terrible history of human 
rights violations8 implicitly condoned by the impunity that followed their 
commission, these developments aptly qualify Cameroon as a transitional 
                                            
L Rev 1455-1485; Orentlicher 2007 IJTJ 10-22; Govier "What is Acknowledgment and 
Why is it Important?" 63-89. 
4  For a discussion on the historical evolution of the "Anglophone problem", see the 
following works: Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997 J Mod Afr Stud 207-229; International 
Crisis Group Cameroon 21-22; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2000 African Anthropologist 5-
32; Konings and Nyamnjoh Negotiating an Anglophone Identity 193-207; and Konings 
and Nyamnjoh "Paul Biya and the 'Anglophone Problem'" 191-234. 
5  Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997 J Mod Afr Stud 207-229; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2000 
African Anthropologist 5-32; Konings and Nyamnjoh Negotiating an Anglophone Identity 
193-207; Konings and Nyamnjoh "Paul Biya and the 'Anglophone Problem'" 191-234. 
6  Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997 J Mod Afr Stud 207-229; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2000 
African Anthropologist 5-32; Konings and Nyamnjoh Negotiating an Anglophone Identity 
193-207; Konings and Nyamnjoh "Paul Biya and the 'Anglophone Problem'" 191-234. 
7  Amnesty International 2017-2018 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/ 
cameroon/report-cameroon; also see US Department of State 2016 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/265446.pdf. 
8  Amnesty International 2017-2018 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/ 
cameroon/report-cameroon; also see US Department of State 2016 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/265446.pdf. 
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society in a state of conflict.9 This paper also argues that for Cameroon to 
transcend its present bitterly fragmented condition would require adopting a 
political dispensation in which truth, justice and reconciliation would prevail, 
after the imposition of criminal sanctions on the persons responsible for the 
atrocities that are taking place.10 
The paper commences with a glance at the notion of political violence, which 
discussion is followed by a brief history of political violence in Cameroon. It 
then describes the current ongoing political crisis in Cameroon, making 
mention of some of the atrocities that have been committed. It examines the 
woundedness of the victims of these atrocities and then identifies the 
distinguishing elements of these atrocities, with a specific focus on their scale 
and their organised nature. Finally, the paper argues that these atrocities may 
qualify as crimes against humanity and as genocide – serious crimes in 
international law which, as discussed below, warrant some form of sanction. 
2 Political violence in Africa's "democracies" 
As a tidal wave of democratisation swept across most of post-colonial Africa in 
the early 1990s, demands for political reform introduced a new dynamic of 
social violence within both urban and rural communities. This was 
accompanied by the perpetration of political violence, a sui generis form of 
social violence of different forms and magnitudes. It might involve the 
brutalisation of political dissidents, the use of tear gas, dogs and batons to 
disperse rioters, political abductions, the formation of guerrilla groups, 
rebellions, the vandalism of public infrastructure, the identification and 
victimisation of specific individuals perceived as "political animals" by the 
perpetrators, mob violence, physical fights between legislators, and even 
assassinations.11 Various narratives have been shared by victims and media 
personnel which disclose the acceptance and normalisation of political 
violence in different corners of the African continent as a kind of political 
                                            
9  Based on the gravity of the human rights violations that have been committed, and the 
trauma suffered by the victims attributable to the current political conflict between the 
Francophone-led/dominated government and the English-speaking population, even 
though unacknowledged formally, there is a political conflict in Cameroon. Within this 
political conflict, political violence is taking place. 
10  The imposition of individual criminal responsibility in this context should not be limited 
to individuals who committed the material elements of crimes. Ain terms of the tradition 
in international criminal justice, individual criminal responsibility should be imposed on 
those who are directly and indirectly involved in the commission of these atrocities - the 
persons who committed the material elements of these crimes as well as those remotely 
involved in them through planning, ordering or instigating them or aiding and abetting 
others to commit them. 
11  Meadow 2009 Marq L Rev 231. 
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culture, especially when utilised by a segment of the population to make a 
political point or oppose a political move. In the following paragraphs this paper 
addresses the notion of political violence and identifies its key attributes in 
order to be able to assess claims that what is transpiring in Cameroon is not 
just criminal but is indeed a form of political violence. 
2.1 Delineating the notion of political violence 
The term "political violence" remains very fluid in academic discourse, as 
scholars in the social sciences approach it from different angles. Various 
definitions have been proposed,12 but there is some agreement that the 
concept of political violence belongs in the domain of contentious politics, a 
view that is held by David Luban, for example, who uses a legal lens to see 
crimes against humanity as the gross and lamentable consequence of "politics 
gone cancerous".13 In Rios' opinion political violence is a phenomenon that has 
"been growing in alarming proportions across the world".14 Aolin cautions that 
an understanding of what constitutes political violence has not earned 
universal endorsement.15 
The definition of political violence propounded by Moser and Clark16 and 
adopted by Rios describes it as "the commission of violent acts motivated by 
a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power".17 In 
other words, it relates to the acquisition or retention of political power through 
violent acts. Dumouchel sees political violence as "violence that is committed 
in the context of a political conflict, or that can be related, either through its 
cause or through its motive, to political issues"18 and argues that in a 
democracy political violence may be perceived differently by different persons, 
depending on their political leanings.19 Where there is a political culture with 
established institutions and norms, the state seems to hold the monopoly of 
legitimate violence.20 Dumouchel argues further that for an act to qualify as 
political violence, a political dimension must be evident in its cause or motive.21 
Hansen, however, is of the view that political violence is characterised by the 
                                            
12  Amongst the scholars worthy of mention is Thomas Obel Hansen, who labels it an 
"essentially contested concept" (Hansen Political Violence in Kenya 1). 
13  Luban 2004 Yale J Int'l L 85-167. 
14  Rios 2004 Language, Literacy, & Culture Review 29-43. 
15  Aolin 2006 Colum J Gender & L 829-849. 
16  Moser and Clark Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? 36. 
17  Rios 2004 Language, Literacy, & Culture Review 30. Hansen also adopts this definition: 
Hansen Political Violence in Kenya 1. 
18  Dumouchel 2012 Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 117-123. 
19  Dumouchel 2012 Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 117-123. 
20  Dumouchel 2012 Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 120. 
21  Dumouchel 2012 Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 120. 
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"pursuit of political objectives (and not [of] the end result of gaining or not 
gaining political power)".22 Borrowing from some of the leading definitions that 
have been postulated, one may define political violence as an act or series of 
acts used by individuals or groups of individuals to intimidate, harm, exploit, 
disrupt, undermine, hasten, delay, reverse, or alter the composition, 
functioning or continuity of a political institution or composition or structure. 
The underlying impetus behind political violence is the yearning for power. This 
is evident in the actions of tyrannical regimes, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, 
and extremist religious and ethnic groups, including those who seek to 
undermine others, as they strive to achieve hegemony over a region, group or 
state. Distinct from both economic and social violence, political violence is 
often more collective in scope, is usually systematic in organisation, and is 
generally widespread in terms of the victimisation it precipitates. It can be 
sporadic, as a specific individual or group of persons becomes the target. Its 
occurrence in different parts of the world is triggered by any of a set of factors 
simultaneously present: conditions of acute deprivation, unending oppression, 
disastrous economic and social policies which consign a good proportion of a 
population to chronic poverty, unemployment, and social inequality and 
injustice. All of these motivate the drive for political power. As said by one 
scholar, 
[i]ncreasingly, today's civil conflicts become messy and intense as political 
violence inflicts human pain and suffering between communal or tribal groups in 
intra-state conflicts. As some modern civil conflicts involving such cultural 
dimensions as ethnicity and religion become increasingly violent, and violence is 
employed to create pain and suffering, one wonders about the cruelty and violent 
nature of one group or national government over another. The intensity of political 
violence in today's civil conflicts continue to be unimaginable, and one would 
naturally seek an explanation for such violence.23 
A few inferences can be drawn from these definitions. What are the tactics? 
Political violence includes beatings, abductions, murders, extermination, 
sexual abuse such as rape, forced pregnancies and sterilisation, looting, and 
the perpetration of acts of vandalism on private and public properties.24 The 
second inference relates to the identity of those who perpetrate or participate 
in political violence: government officials, party leaders or surrogates such as 
militia groups, paid thugs, law enforcement personnel, campaign workers, 
party loyalists and so forth. Thirdly, the venues in which political violence is 
committed include public arenas, state institutions, polling stations, etc. 
                                            
22  Hansen concurs with this as well: Hansen Political Violence in Kenya 1; also see Hibbs 
Mass Political Violence. 
23  Hiratsuka 2012 Educational Studies 91-99, 92. 
24  Hansen also adopts this definition: Hansen Political Violence in Kenya 1. 
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Fourthly, there is the timing of the violence. This may sometimes be 
spontaneous, depending on the issue at hand, but sometimes the spontaneity 
is spurious, and it can frequently be an organised response perhaps to protests 
calling for equality or redress. 
Granted, political violence is an outcome of "contentious politics", but it also 
has legal implications. If the acts committed in this context are criminal, then 
they should not only be labelled as such but should also be prosecuted. The 
same should apply when such acts meet the definition of serious crimes in 
international law. There is an intersection between political violence and 
international law, a relation that is acknowledged by one legal scholar as he 
argues that crimes against humanity are the gross and lamentable 
consequences of politics gone cancerous.25 Varying in form, recent 
developments in the past two decades show that political violence may even 
be perpetrated in the context of religious fundamentalism.26 
In societies entrapped in contentious politics, the motives underlying political 
violence may vary. Meadow articulates that one such motive is "usually to force 
compliance, to subjugate, to persuade, or to intimidate, except for those most 
deviant individuals or groups who enjoy pointless bloodshed".27 
The scale of political violence may transcend the bounds of the ordinary, and 
when specific circumstances are present, the actions may qualify as serious 
crimes in international law. Arguably, such violence should attract the 
intervention of the global community. In addition, a society in which such 
violence occurs may well be called a conflict society28 or a transitional society 
requiring transitional justice.29 Irrespective of which of these it is, and 
depending on factors such as the kinds of acts committed, their 
organised/systematic nature, the scale of the devastation and the motives 
underlying it, mechanisms for accountability should be put in place.  
                                            
25  Luban 2004 Yale J Int'l L 85-167. 
26  Emerson and Hartman 2006 Annu Rev Sociol 127-144; Hunsberger 1995 J Soc Issues 
113-129; Brandt and Reyna 2010 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 715-725. 
27  Meadow 2009 Marq L Rev 231. 
28  According to Meadow 2009 Marq L Rev 231, a conflict society is a society that is 
"characterised by a lack of consensus on governance, questionable legitimacy of 
governing institutions, or unresolved and ongoing religious, racial, or ethnic cleavages. 
Commonly, such conflict is manifested through civil war, guerrilla conflicts, domestic 
terrorism, or domestic military campaigns": Meadow 2009 Marq L Rev 232; see 
generally Marchetti and Tocci 2009 Global Change, Peace & Security 205. 
29  Teitel defines transitional justice as "the conception of justice associated with periods of 
political change, characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes"; Teitel 2003 Harv Hum Rts J 69. 
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2.2 Gauging the sui generis impact and dimensions of political violence  
As already said, political violence may take different forms.30 It may also vary 
in terms of the extent to which it is organised and its scale. 
Victimisation is undoubtedly the unavoidable consequence of political 
violence, and the victims (both direct and indirect)31 have their dignity 
assaulted. The dignity of a human being is inherent in his or her personhood. 
It is so integral to individuality that the right to dignity may seem to be the most 
inalienable of any human right.32 When a person's dignity is injured or violated, 
there is a feeling of woundedness in the person, a feeling that is not easily and 
quickly extinguished. That person is in need of restoration, which is unlikely to 
emanate from the state. The perpetration of political violence by a set of 
individuals under the direction of the state damages the relationship between 
the victims and the perpetrators.33 The victims have a reasonable expectation 
that the state will fulfil its obligations to respect, protect and promote their 
human rights,34 yet in perpetrating the political violence the state thwarts these 
expectations and its relationship with its citizens is severed. 
Political violence often involves brute harm to the victim's personhood, but it 
can also involve economic deprivation or psychological damage following the 
loss of loved ones. Those who experience such loss are often denied 
knowledge of the source and circumstances of their trauma. Who pulled the 
trigger that killed my son? Why was my daughter kidnapped? Why was my son 
arrested, detained and tortured? Why have they targeted us? Not getting the 
answers to such questions is in itself a kind of torture. The people feel betrayed 
by the political order and the relationship of trust is broken: the people's trust 
in the state, and also the state's trust in its citizens. Regardless of whether the 
victims are othered in terms of their ethnicity, their tribe, their religion, their 
race, their sexual orientation or their political affiliation, and regardless of how 
                                            
30  Meadow 2009 Marq L Rev 231. 
31  Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims 
of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law UN GAR 
A/RES/60/147 (2006); also see Agbor 2017 PELJ 11. 
32  See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art 1: "All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights…". 
33  As used in this context, "relationships" are not confined to the ordinary intimacies shared 
between those related by affinity or consanguinity. The sense of the term must be 
broadened to include all those involved in the state system who are bound to one 
another by some set of obligations, such as the apparatchiks, the elite superiors, the 
public, and even the international authorities. 
34  Cassese International Law 384-386. 
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they perceive themselves, they are perceived by the state as enemies within 
the system, as "enemies inside". 
When the state fails to acknowledge the injustices emanating from its 
perpetration of political violence, the ensuing silence and official denials simply 
prolong the suffering of the victims. The failure of the system to recognise the 
victims as legitimate members of the political order strips them of their 
personhood. If healing is ever to occur, the process will have to begin with 
restoring their full rights as human beings, and yet the trauma may remain 
unhealed. Also, there is scarcely ever any form of sanction of the perpetrators 
of political violence, irrespective of the scale of the victimisation, so that the 
suffering endured by the victims far exceeds the acknowledgement of 
accountability by the guilty. Their reluctance to express remorse and atone for 
their actions makes it very difficult for the victims to accede to reconciliation. 
2.3 A synopsis of the perpetration of political violence in Cameroon  
Cameroon's legal and political system makes little allowance for public 
participation. These institutions are not designed for this purpose, and even 
when such accommodation exists on paper, numerous technicalities are 
inserted which eventually make public participation a practical impossibility. A 
pertinent example of this is the limitation of access to the Constitutional 
Council.35 Cameroon is a democracy in theory but more of a surveillance state 
in practice, as citizens' freedoms have been curtailed and their rights infringed 
through increased state control in both public and private life. Political violence 
has been a normal and acceptable part of Cameroonian politics for the past 
                                            
35  The Constitution mandates the Constitutional Council as the institution with the power 
to resolve matters pertaining to the Constitution. The mandate and access thereto are 
provided in Article 47 of the Constitution: 
(1)  The Constitutional Council shall give a final ruling on:  
- the constitutionality of laws, treaties and international agreements;  
- the constitutionality of the standing orders of the National Assembly and the 
Senate prior to their implementation;  
- conflict of powers between State institutions; between the State and the 
Regions, and between the Regions.  
(2)  Matters may be referred to the Constitutional Council by the President of the 
Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, 
one-third of the members of the National Assembly or one-third of the Senators. 
Presidents of regional executives may refer matters to the Constitutional Council 
whenever the interests of their Regions are at stake.  
(3)  Laws as well as treaties and international agreements may, prior to their 
enactment, be referred to the Constitutional Council by the President of the 
Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, 
one-third of the members of the National Assembly, one-third of the Senators, or 
the Presidents of regional executives pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (2) 
above.  
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28 years or so, its purpose being to consolidate the status quo and maintain 
power for the benefit of the few. A quick walk down memory lane will support 
this statement. In 1990 demands for political pluralism were marked by the 
formation of political parties and other political groups in the hope that this 
would end the decades-long one-party rule. These demands were rejected 
outright and met with the use of brute force on the instructions of the 
government. Arrests, prolonged detentions, enforced disappearances, 
extrajudicial killings, assassinations that did not spare even the clergy, and 
assaults on numerous civil liberties were perpetrated by the Biya regime under 
the cover of fostering national unity and maintaining public order. Surreptitious 
operations were launched against unarmed civilians who had engaged in mass 
political protest against the system as a means of participating in the 
governance of their land. The 1990 political demands came from a broad 
spectrum of Cameroonians – Francophones and Anglophones, Christians and 
Muslims, literates and illiterates, young and old, poor and rich, employed and 
unemployed, the privileged, the downtrodden, the homeless. Some legislative 
reforms were made in response.36 Whether or not these have been of any use 
is a moot point. 
A brief time later the liberalisation and democratisation of Cameroon's politics 
would trigger calls for a sovereign national conference – a national forum 
where elected and appointed public officials would be held accountable for the 
socio-economic and political wrongs committed by them while in office.37 The 
protracted delays and repeated categorical denials by the President plunged 
the entire nation into chaos – mass protests, vandalism, and the destruction of 
public infrastructure were some of the anti-government protest tactics used by 
the people. The common cry was "Biya doit partir" ("Biya must go!").38 In 
response, the government perpetrated acts of political violence similar to those 
committed in 1990. However, the scale of state violence was increased, as 
was the ferocity and intensity of the action, as the underlying motive was to 
silence dissident voices and reinforce the leader's grip on political power. 
1992 was not very different from the previous two years. Following the first 
multi-party presidential election, which was held in October 1992, the country 
slipped into the abyss of rancorous politics and disintegrated into a political 
                                            
36  Examples of these laws include the law on Law on Freedom of Mass Communication, 
Law No 90/052 of 19 December 1990, commonly referred to as the "MC Law of 1990", 
and Law Enabling the Formation of Political Parties, Law No 90/056 of 19 December 
1990; Fombad "Mass Media and Democratisation in Africa" 228; Takougang and 
Krieger African State and Society 117. 
37  Konings "Post-colonial State and Economic and Political Reforms" 244-265. 
38  Konings "Post-colonial State and Economic and Political Reforms" 244-265. 
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dystopia. Law enforcement personnel, military and para-military units were 
deployed to counter civilian protests, and performed sinister acts of political 
violence. The imposition of a state of emergency in Bamenda (the seat of the 
Social Democratic Front, Cameroon's leading opposition political party and the 
then residence of its National Chair, John Fru Ndi) and the circumscription of 
the civil and political rights of the people therein were some of the measures 
taken by the Biya regime to quell the protest action. 
In 2008 constitutional reforms to give the President of the Republic an 
unlimited term of office sparked another series of public protests across the 
nation. Once again the Biya regime used similar tactics of violent suppression, 
to the same ends – the curtailment of political rights and freedoms, the denial 
of citizens' participation, and the retention of political power. 
As already said, political violence is not new to Cameroon. It is the 
government's established modus operandi of curtailing citizenship.39 The 
Anglophone crisis that erupted in 2016 with its call for either federalism or 
secession has gone unresolved because of the persistent use of political 
violence as an answer to this complex political question. This crisis has been 
different from others in the country in many ways. Firstly, it is geographically 
limited to the English-speaking regions, where the mass deployment of 
predominantly French-speaking Cameroonian troops in the military and para-
military units has increased the tension.40 Secondly, the scale of the brutality 
is unfathomable. Thirdly, the attack here is directed not only against a people 
but also against their culture, institutions, processes and legacy. Fourthly, the 
purpose of the action is to reinforce the subservience of English-speaking 
Cameroonians as second-class citizens in relation to their French-speaking 
counterparts.41 Given these purposes, the nature of the violence has been 
different from before. Innocent and unarmed civilians, including women and 
children, have been the hapless victims of the persecution. Sporadic covert 
                                            
39  See generally the following works on these political developments in Cameroon: 
International Crisis Group Cameroon 21-22; Konings "Post-colonial State and Economic 
and Political Reforms" 244-265. 
40  For a sketchy description of these incidents see the following online publications: 
Kindzeka 2017 http://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-troops-deployed-ahead-of-anglo 
phone-independence-declaration/a-40751054; Shaban 2017 http://www.africa 
news.com/2017/11/17/upsurge-of-violence-in-cameroon-s-anglophone-crisis-worries-
un/; and Sixtus 2017 https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/12/04/cameroon-
government-declares-war-secessionist-rebels. 
41  For an understanding of the "Anglophone problem" see generally the following works: 
International Crisis Group Cameroon 21-22; Konings "Post-colonial State and Economic 
and Political Reforms" 244-265; Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997 J Mod Afr Stud 207-229; 
Konings and Nyamnjoh 2000 African Anthropologist 5-32; Konings and Nyamnjoh 
Negotiating an Anglophone Identity 193-207; and Konings and Nyamnjoh "Paul Biya 
and the 'Anglophone Problem'" 191-234. 
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acts have been committed by state-directed operatives, including the military, 
the gendarmes, and para-military units such as the BMM and BIR,42 who have 
flooded and ransacked the villages of people who could be described as 
actively passive in the political processes and institutions. Homes have been 
raided, occupants assaulted, youths chased into the bushes, and private 
property looted. People have been arbitrarily arrested, social gatherings 
prohibited, and movement restricted during certain hours. Neighbouring 
Nigeria has recorded a huge number of Cameroonian refugees from these 
regions.43 All of these acts have occurred in specific areas of the English-
speaking regions of Cameroon. And the salient feature of these actions is 
easily perceived – they are systematic in nature.44 The key political actors in 
Cameroon's French-speaking regions are the remote instigators of the 
violence, who plan, order, aid and abet the commission of these acts. The use 
of the armed forces against political dissidents has far exceeded the bounds 
of conventional law enforcement. In recent times, most of the English-speaking 
population centres have been under constant attack, and the people's 
livelihoods have been destroyed. As the violence is constant, it would seem to 
any observer to be the usual way in which Cameroonians conduct their day-
to-day lives and, as observed by Simpson, Mokwena and Segal, the 
unpalatable consequences of the acceptance and normalisation of such a 
historical process of violence 
… manifest themselves not only in the formal political arena, but are displaced in 
all spheres of life. Hence it seems appropriate to talk of a culture of violence, the 
systematic intrusion of violence, political at origin…45 
2.4 Beyond the borders of "normally acceptable" political violence 
Across, the globe, political violence is a regular feature of contentious politics, 
as political actors resolve the key political questions of who gets what, when, 
why and how – irrespective of the political system of the state in which the 
violence takes place (established democracies, emerging democracies, fig-
                                            
42  These French acronyms refer to different para-military units in Cameroon: BMM stands 
for Brigade Mobile Mixte, which is comprised of soldiers, gendarmes and police forces 
which conduct day-to-day operations in the country. BIR stands for Batallion 
d'Intervention Rapide. Roughly translated, it means Rapid Response Brigade.  
43  Carsten 2018 https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1F01P3-OZATP; Dahir 
2018 https://qz.com/1179202/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-threatening-to-spin-out-
of-control/; and Shaban 2018 http://www.africanews.com/2018/03/31/condition-of-
cameroonian-refugees-in-nigeria-worries-top-unhcr-official/. 
44  The term "systematic" as used here refers to the organised nature of the crimes that 
have or are being committed; see the brief discussion below on the definitional elements 
of crimes against humanity; see generally Agbor "Reflection on the Phrase 'Widespread 
or Systematic'" 352-378. 
45  Simpson, Mokwena and Segal 1991 S Afr Hum Rts Yrbk 195. 
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leaf democracies, autocracies, monarchies, etc). The way political disputes are 
resolved in a legal system is a key determinant of the likelihood of the 
perpetration of political violence. In other words, where legal and political 
institutions are constitutionally mandated to resolve disputes, and where over 
time such institutions fulfil their mandate by making themselves accessible to 
the people in order to work with them towards a resolution of a dispute, then 
the tendency of the people to resort to political violence is minimised. On the 
other hand, where such institutions and processes are made inaccessible and 
designed to consolidate the grip on power of a political elite, then the 
probability of recurrent political violence becomes very high. In part, 
responsibility for the high incidence of political violence in Cameroon may be 
attributed to the absence of strong institutional and legal mechanisms that 
could engage in the resolution of political disputes. 
The focus of this paper, however, is the perpetration in Cameroon of political 
violence that exceeds the bounds of what can be described as normally 
acceptable political violence in any society. Given its scale and the organised 
nature of the violence, and its direction against a particular segment of the 
population, it is very likely that crimes against humanity have been committed 
in Cameroon. 
2.5 The commission of crimes against humanity in Cameroon 
Since the last quarter of 2016 the people of English-speaking Cameroon have 
been subjected to incessant violent acts that target their lives and political 
freedoms. These acts include the killing of identified individuals, the mass 
arrests of youths, prolonged detentions without criminal charges, torture, 
inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment, and the sexual molestation 
of abducted females, all of which are politically motivated.46 The scale of the 
victimisation, as has been said, is very wide. In addition, the perpetrators of 
these crimes are police officers and military personnel of all ranks deployed 
mostly from the French-speaking area of the country, some of whom are 
attached to para-military units such as the BIR or the GMI. The atrocities are 
perpetrated on the instructions of senior state officials of the Francophone-led 
government. Put simply, the planning and preparation of these crimes, and 
their perpetration, are the responsibility of the state (that is, the Francophone-
                                            
46  The argument that these acts are politically motivated is based on a very simple and 
straightforward premise: in response to the demands of these political entities for 
secession or federation, the Francophone-led government intends to silence the 
publication of these opinions, slow the momentum of change, restrain the political 
participation of the citizenry, and ultimately jettison the issue as irrelevant to Cameroon's 
contemporary politics. 
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led government). However, the issue here is not so much the commission of 
these crimes. The bigger and more complicated issue is the fact that these 
crimes constitute a concerted, planned attack47 which in my opinion is not only 
massive in scale but is also systematic, given its organised nature. When the 
crimes listed here are directed against a civilian population, then the conditions 
in which they can be characterised as crimes against humanity have been 
fulfilled.48 
The commission of crimes against humanity or the failure to prevent or prohibit 
them falls under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.49 Per the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, crimes against humanity include  
… any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack: 
a) Murder; 
b) Extermination; 
c) Enslavement; 
d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
f) Torture; 
g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
                                            
47  The Rome Statute of the ICC defines an attack as follows: "'Attack directed against any 
civilian population' means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance 
of a state or organisational policy to commit such attack"; see Rome Statute of the ICC, 
Art 7(2)(a). According to Mettraux, the requirement of an attack within the definition of 
crimes against humanity denotes "a course of conduct involving the commission of acts 
of violence": Mettraux International Crimes 156. 
48  For the definition of crimes against humanity, see the Rome Statute of the ICC, Art 7(1). 
Earlier definitions were to be found in various international instruments that predate the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. For a descriptive and analytical history of crimes against 
humanity, see generally Agbor "Reflection on the Phrase 'Widespread or Systematic'" 
352-378. 
49  Rome Statute of the ICC, Art 5 (jurisdiction of the ICC) and Art 7 (crimes against 
humanity). 
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international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph 
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
j) The crime of apartheid; 
k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.50 
One of the requirements of the definition of such crimes is that they involve the 
element of an attack, which is described as "a course of conduct involving the 
commission of acts of violence".51 This may include even the maltreatment of 
persons who take no active part in hostilities.52 In the context of the definition, 
the attack is the "vehicle for the commission of crimes against humanity".53 
Accordingly, the attack is the framework in which the crimes are perpetrated.54 
In order to determine whether the attack in question is widespread or 
systematic, a few parameters to consider are the number of the criminal acts, 
the number of the victims, the existence of criminal patterns, the existence of 
a policy or plan targeting specific group(s) of individuals, the inescapability of 
the attack, the involvement of military or political authorities, the logistics and 
financial resources involved, the existence of public statements or political 
views underpinning the events, the means and methods used in the attacks, 
and the adoption of discriminatory measures.55 
Looking closely at the nature of the criminal acts that have been committed, 
their repetitiveness, the scale of the violence, the specific targets of these 
crimes (which indicate that they are planned in accordance with policy), and 
the involvement of military and para-military units under the control of the 
Francophone-led government, it is clear that an attack is taking place, and that 
it is directed against the civilian population of English-speaking Cameroonians. 
                                            
50  Rome Statute of the ICC, Art 7(1). While the jurisprudence of the ICC is still being 
developed, for a general understanding of the core elements of these crimes, the 
jurisprudence of the two ad hoc UN tribunals is invaluable. In addition, the publications 
of academics offer useful insights: see generally Triffterer Commentary on the Rome 
Statute; Cassese, Gaeta and Jones Rome Statute. 
51  Mettraux International Crimes 156; also see Art 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
for the meaning of the word "attack".  
52  The Appeal Chamber held that "the attack in the context of a crime against humanity is 
not limited to the use of armed force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian 
population…"; see Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač & Zoran Vuković v The 
Prosecutor Case No IT-96-23 & 23/1-T Appeals Chamber of 12 June 2002 para 86; The 
Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač & Zoran Vuković Case No IT-96-23-T 
& 23/1-T Trial Chamber I of 22 February 2001 para 416. 
53  Mettraux International Crimes 157. 
54  Mettraux International Crimes 157. 
55  Mettraux International Crimes 171. 
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The crimes that have been committed include murders, abductions, random 
arrests and the prolonged detention of the individuals arrested, torture, sexual 
molestation, and other inhumane acts. The definition in the Rome Statute of 
the ICC of an attack leading to crimes against humanity ("a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population") is extensively 
covered, leaving little room for uncertainty.56 In my view, the violence in 
Cameroon is taking place within the framework of systematic planning directed 
against a civilian population. In the circumstances, it is submitted that crimes 
against humanity have been and are being committed in Cameroon. 
2.6 Cameroon: portrait of a conflict-torn, transitional society? 
The question to which answers should be given is how to deal with the crimes 
that have been and are being committed in Cameroon. Previous instances of 
political violence were marked by a complete absence of any form of 
accountability. No legal avenues have been put in place to prosecute the 
perpetrators of the criminal violence and the victims were never provided with 
any remedies for their ills.57 This has further blackened the country's already 
black human rights record.58 Cameroon therefore remains a fragmented, 
broken and disunited land where the pains endured by the victims of human 
rights violations remain as sharp today as on the day they were inflicted. The 
commission of a serious crime in international law59 is not simply to be ignored. 
                                            
56  See, for example, the following cases: The Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza Case No 
ICTR-97-20-T Trial Chamber III of 15 May 2003 para 326; The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul 
Akayesu Case No ICTR-96-4-T Trial Chamber I of 2 September 1998 paras 460-469; 
The Prosecutor v Alfred Musema Case No ICTR-96-13-T Trial Chamber I of 27 January 
2000 paras 199-211; The Prosecutor v George Rutaganda Case No ICTR-96-3-T Trial 
Chamber I of 6 December 1999 paras 65-71; The Prosecutor v Clement Kayishemba 
and Obed Ruzindana Case No ICTR-95-1-T Trial Chamber I of 21 May 1999 paras 119-
134. 
57  International law unequivocally recognises the right to an effective remedy for violations 
of human rights. Numerous treaties both at global and regional levels provide this right. 
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art 8; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Art 2(3)(a); the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), Art 
14(1); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (hereafter the CRC), Art 39; the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) (hereafter the European Convention), Art 13; the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights (1969) (hereafter the American Convention), Art 25(1); the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) (hereafter the Banjul Charter), Art 
7(1)(a); and African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2000) (hereafter Maputo Protocol), Art 25; see 
also Agbor 2017 PELJ 11. 
58  For a corroboration of this, see the US Department of State's annual country human 
rights reports on Cameroon for the past several years. 
59  A crime against humanity is a serious crime in international law (per the language of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, Art 7). It is also a uniquely developed serious crime in 
international law through customary international law, unlike the crime of genocide and 
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It is imperative for Cameroon to address the trauma suffered by a large part of 
its population if it is to become a unified state where accountability, truth, peace 
and justice prevail. 
3 The aftermath of the current political crisis – pursuing 
justice and accountability  
The pursuit of justice in a post-conflict society that has experienced grave 
violations of human rights is in my opinion key to the achievement of peace, 
stability and unity. In the context of Cameroon, given the nature of the 
violations committed, bringing justice to both the victims and the perpetrators 
would signal the end of one era and usher in another, an era characterised by 
accountability for the wrongs previously committed. Specific individuals would 
have to bear responsibility for what transpired. The imposition of individual 
criminal responsibility makes possible the allocation of individual guilt, rather 
than the assigning of collective guilt on everyone. The individuals who bear 
responsibility would have to be identified, investigated, charged, prosecuted, 
and convicted. In addition, the institutions through which they perpetrated 
these atrocities would have to be discredited and dismantled. Lastly, 
Cameroonians would be provided with a unique and priceless opportunity to 
document permanently a record of the victims' experiences. 
In the following discussion we share our views on what we consider to be the 
role that justice should play in conflict-torn Cameroon. 
3.1 The role of justice in peace building and reconciliation 
Numerous social scientists (scholars and practitioners alike) have doubted 
openly the role of justice in peace-building and reconciliation in societies that 
have undergone profound human rights violations on a massive scale. Even 
though this paper does not attempt to settle the issue, the developments that 
occurred in many such societies tend to suggest to this author that justice has 
a significant role to play in peace building and reconciliation. The legal and 
political developments that occurred in many post-conflict transitional societies 
stand as eloquent examples of instances where justice became a tool not only 
for accountability but also for initiating and managing the much-needed 
reconciliation and peace-building processes. Examples of this abound: the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Cambodia, and East Timor.60 
                                            
war crimes, are treaty crimes. Put together, these constitute serious crimes in 
international law due to their inherent gravity; see Obura "Duty to Prosecute 
International Crimes". 
60  Scharf and Williams 2003 Case W Res J Int'l L 161-190. 
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It would be good to be able to add Cameroon to this list. Quoting Justice 
Goldstone, Ed Vulliamy, correspondent for The Guardian, observed some time 
ago that "[j]ustice being done, and being seen to be done, is the difference 
between a lasting peace and an interval between hostilities".61 
Bringing about a just dispensation in Cameroon would require the imposition 
of constraints on the actions of both state and non-state actors. Justice 
depends on acknowledging the primacy of the truth, and in Cameroon would 
necessarily also involve addressing the human rights abuses that have already 
occurred. To ignore those abuses would be to perpetuate the mistrust of the 
entire socio-legal and political system, and not only to grant legitimacy to the 
past violations of whatever is humane and kind in an orderly society but also 
by implication to validate such actions in the future. 
3.2 Establishing individual responsibility, denying collective guilt and 
deterring future violations 
The pursuit of justice in Cameroon would identify and expose individuals who 
bear responsibility for the atrocities committed and would avoid assigning 
collective guilt to the entire population. In situations where specific individuals 
are not identified there is a temptation to assign collective guilt to the people 
as a whole or to a group of people. By individualising guilt the idea that the 
adversary group as a whole earse collective responsibility for committing the 
crimes would be contradicted, and so justice would become an invaluable tool 
in promoting peace and reconciliation. Michael Walzer writes that: 
… the assignment of responsibility is the critical test of the argument for justice… 
If there are recognisable war crimes, there must be recognisable criminals… The 
theory of justice should point us to the men and women from whom we can rightly 
demand an accounting, and it should shape and control the judgments we make 
of the excuses they offer (or that are offered on their behalf) … There can be no 
justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women.62 
Making use of justice as a means of bringing about accountability for the 
atrocities committed in Cameroon would require the prosecution of the leaders 
who bear responsibility for what has taken place,63 and norms and institutions 
would have to de developed to make this possible. Otherwise the persons who 
escaped their individual criminal responsibility would be emboldened by their 
                                            
61  Vulliamy 1998 Int Aff 89.  
62  Walzer Just and Unjust Wars 287-288. 
63  "Modes of participation" here has to do with direct and indirect involvement. In tandem 
with developments in international law, Art 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC stipulates 
the various modes of participation in the commission of serious crimes in international 
law. 
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impunity and might at the least attempt to interfere with the peace-building 
process. 
3.3 Demolishing the institutions of the failed past and exposing the 
leaders responsible for the commission of atrocities 
Pre-conflict Cameroon was characterised by numerous ills that made it more 
or less a banana republic: rife corruption, maladministration, absence of the 
rule of law, weak institutions, an overarching executive, a dysfunctional 
legislature, chronic poverty, high levels of unemployment, a weak judicial 
system, a culture of impunity, political exclusion, and the belief that democracy 
is a matter of who gets the greatest numbers in an election rather than how 
well minorities are protected. The institution of justice in the country would help 
to change this. It would discredit the leaders as well as the ideology that have 
promoted political violence. Such institutions inevitably rule by law, which is 
not at all the same thing as the rule of law. When a government denies the 
inalienable rights of some its citizens, this denial is facilitated through the use 
of political and legal structures. In South Africa the apartheid government used 
its legal apparatus to oppress the majority of the country's citizens. What were 
ironically called the "security" police were used to torture and murder members 
of the black opposition groups.64 The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission had the task of documenting the full extent of government 
involvement in the commission of racially-motivated inhumanities, and was so 
successful that it was able to remove the stigma of past wrongs from the new 
governmental institutions. 
Through the work of such a commission it would be possible to dismantle the 
institutions and discredit the leaders who initiated and implemented the 
campaign of atrocities in Cameroon against Cameroonians. In the event that 
there was a failure to disclose information about those responsible for these 
human rights violations, then they might ultimately earn some degree of de 
facto legitimisation. There is a need for accountability In Cameroon in order to 
de-legitimise and discredit the individuals, institutions and ideology that 
contributed to the commission of these grave human rights violations. Justice 
Goldstone entertained the view that 
… exposure of the nature and extent of human rights violations frequently will 
reveal a systematic and institutional pattern of gross human rights violations. It 
will assist in the identification and dismantling of institutions responsible and deter 
future recurrences.65 
                                            
64  Scharf and Williams 2003 Case W Res J Int'l L 171. 
65  Goldstone 1996 NYU J Int'l Law & Pol 485, 490. 
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3.4 Documenting a detailed historical record of the past 
A multitude of crimes has been committed against unarmed civilians in the 
English-speaking regions of Cameroon. They constitute assaults on their 
human rights and liberties. Perpetrated on the instructions of the Francophone-
led government and executed by the forces of law and order and other para-
military units, the scale of the victimisation is huge. In the aftermath of these 
atrocities, it is hoped that the pursuit of justice will enable Cameroonians and 
the international community to thoroughly document the details. A reliable 
record of those events must be compiled if their recurrence is to be prevented. 
Michael Ignatieff states that 
… the great value of legal proceedings is that their evidentiary rules confer 
legitimacy on otherwise contestable facts. In this sense, war crimes trials make it 
more difficult for societies to take refuge in denial; the trials do assist the process 
of uncovering the truth.66 
Robert Jackson, US Supreme Court Associate Justice and Chief Prosecutor 
at Nuremburg, reasoned like Ignatieff. Reporting to US President Harry 
Truman he said that one of the undeniable legacies of the Nuremburg trials 
was that they documented the Nazi atrocities 
… with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial 
of these crimes in the future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders 
can arise among informed people.67 
Accurately assessing and assigning blame for the gross violations of human 
rights ordered and directed by the state in Cameroon, perpetrated by its 
agents, and occurring over a such a long period would be a daunting task. 
Denials, fabrications and distortions of the truth would be common.68 
There is a need for an accurate report of the conflict, because people, 
especially the victims, need to know what happened and who bears 
responsibility. The trial of these perpetrators, if well executed, would bring out 
specific details of the nature and extent of the crimes, by whom they were 
committed, on whose orders, against which specific victims, and why. As 
Scharf and Williams write, 
[b]y carefully proving these facts one witness at a time in the face of a vigilant 
cross-examination by distinguished defence counsel, the international trials will 
                                            
66  Ignatieff 1996 Index on Censorship 110-122. 
67  Jackson Report to the President 49. 
68  In Richard Goldstone's words, "[i]t doesn't take hours after human rights violations for 
the denials to begin … Justice plays a vital role in stopping that fabrication, in stopping 
that cover-up, which is inevitable": Goldstone Healing Wounded People. 
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produce a definitive account that can pierce the distortions generated by official 
propaganda, endure the test of time, and resist the forces of revisionism.69 
3.5 Victim catharsis 
By bringing the perpetrators of political violence to justice would serve an 
additional function: it would acknowledge the victims of the crimes committed, 
a dimension and role which Scharf and Williams consider to be an "often 
overlooked but equally as important an element to the success of any peace 
process as is punishing the offenders".70 Offering victims an opportunity to 
speak about their injuries publicly, offers them a sense of justice and enables 
them to release their pent-up feelings. Truth, reconciliation, peace building and 
national dialogue would be incomplete if such a platform were not offered to 
the victims of these violations. In the words of Antonio Cassese, the pursuit of 
justice 
… is essential to the restoration of peaceful and normal relations especially for 
people who have had to live under a reign of terror, because it breaks the cycle 
of violence, hatred, and extra-judicial retribution.71 
Regarding victim catharsis, Richard Goldstone notes that 
… the Nuremberg Trials played an important role in enabling victims of the 
Holocaust to obtain official acknowledgement of what befell them.72 
Public acknowledgements of the victims' experiences may constitute some 
form of satisfaction equivalent to reparations. In addition, public narrations may 
also steer the victims away from retaliatory attacks. 
4 Conclusion – the need for the promotion of citizen 
participation in Cameroon 
In the foregoing discussion we have underscored the fact that the nature of 
humanity and politics makes conflict inevitable. However, the probability that 
conflict will escalate to uncontrollable proportions depends on many variables, 
some of which include the political system in place in a particular society, the 
establishment of institutions to manage political conflicts, and the presence of 
the rule of a kind of law that provides for the principle of the equality of all 
before the law as well as the protection of all by the law, the protection of all 
minorities, respect for diversity, and inclusiveness in the political dispensation, 
                                            
69  Scharf and Williams 2003 Case W Res J Int'l L 175. 
70  Scharf and Williams 2003 Case W Res J Int'l L 175. 
71  Yugoslav Tribunal Joint Statement by the President and the Prosecutor UN Doc 
CC/P10/027-E (1995). 
72  Goldstone "Fifty Years after Nuremberg" 215-216. 
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and that encourages dialogue and debate on issues of national interest. These 
factors would enhance citizenship participation in different ways and might 
minimise the possibility of the occurrence of political violence. Unfortunately, 
Cameroon's political dispensation is nothing like this. Cameroonian politics 
derives from the erroneous premise that democracy is based solely on winning 
the majority of the votes in an election, which, in essence, renders minorities 
unprotected, unrecognised and disrespected. In this regard, because there are 
more French-speaking Cameroonians than English-speaking Cameroonians, 
the French Cameroonians believe they can govern as they wish. Tolerance 
and diversity are compromised, and inclusiveness is made a privilege rather 
than a norm. The feeling of marginalisation and disrespect in Cameroon's 
national politics is fuelled by the systematic disregard accorded to Anglophone 
Cameroonians. Their frustration is aggravated by the political system's offering 
no avenues for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. For instance, the judiciary 
is predominantly French-speaking and is also partly responsible for the current 
crisis, as the civil law system is gradually and progressively being imposed in 
the common law regions. The imposition of civil law practitioners in the 
common law areas is not only a cultural and intellectual assault but also 
contributes to the effort to eradicate everything Anglophone. 
To overcome this bitter fragmentation of Cameroonian society, Cameroonians 
must reflect on and practise the ideals of equality in terms of the dignity and 
worth of every person, recognition before the law, protection by the law, and 
the fair distribution of available opportunities. The notion of the equality of 
every person in terms of worth and dignity is fundamental to the success of 
any democracy across the globe. Being democratic, however, does not 
guarantee the success of a state: it merely creates opportunities. In competing 
for these opportunities, everyone should be treated equally, irrespective of 
their gender, linguistic background, or any other identifiable differentiating 
characteristic. In cases of overt discrimination, the victim must explore the 
channels in place to seek redress. The application of the ideals of equality in 
Cameroon will mean that every individual will be given the opportunity to dream 
and to act, to succeed or fail, depending on his or her passions and aptitudes. 
To operate a political order that is discriminatory, disrespectful of the dignity 
and worth of a group of people, politically exclusive and ethnically biased is to 
mould a divided society. As mentioned earlier, these are the realities in 
Cameroon. Discrimination, impunity, and political exclusion are some of the 
reasons for the deep divisions in Cameroonian society. Even though the ruling 
elite suggests otherwise, the current political stalemate is a result of politics 
and policies that have been in place for decades that treat specific classes of 
people as politically worthless. The ruling elite is predominantly from a 
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particular tribe or linguistic group. Perceiving the country as belonging to them, 
they manage it in ways that further their interests only. As such, many 
Cameroonians are excluded from political participation, and when they voice 
their concerns they are victimised by the authorities. 
Lastly, accountability must be made a central tenet in the Cameroonian socio-
legal system. For decades there has been a culture of impunity in the DNA of 
Cameroonian politics. Anything could be done by anyone with political power, 
without that person's having to suffer any legal consequences. The culture of 
impunity imperils Cameroon's democracy and assaults the rule of law. It 
jeopardises the respect for and protection of human rights and leaves the 
people in a state of apprehensiveness. Making people account for their actions 
would be key to healing the divisions, woundedness and bitterness harboured 
in the hearts of many Cameroonians. Cameroon's democracy must be built on 
norms and virtues that take the country forward rather than that keep specific 
individuals in power. These virtues would include the willingness to learn from 
the lessons of history, open-mindedness in speaking out for and against the 
government, a culture of tolerance which enables people to accept those who 
differ from them, honestly appraising facts and policies, developing a sense of 
mutual responsibility, courageously defying orders from superiors which are 
irrational and manifestly unlawful, and a feeling of brotherhood - that all 
Cameroonians rise or fall as one nation. As politics involves the practical 
question of who gets what, when and why within a given system, various 
segments of the population are bound to have conflicting views on what should 
be done. Conflict may become somewhat of a constant in such a situation, and 
it may take different forms, from civil protest to outright violence, including even 
the loss of lives on a large scale. If this is true, then Cameroon as a democratic 
state must put in place institutional mechanisms and processes to ensure that 
conflicts are readily resolved if and when they arise, and norms must be 
established that ensure inclusiveness, accessibility and the equality of all. 
Secondly, political campaigns should be seen as the exercise of this right to 
participate in the governance of one's country. Political campaigns here 
include the preparation and dissemination of literature that contains views 
unacceptable to the existing government. The curtailment of political 
campaigns in itself constitutes a violation of the right to participate in 
government, irrespective of the number of individuals affected. An active 
political citizenry is to be encouraged in a democracy. Thirdly, in any a political 
system the state seems to retain the monopoly of legitimate political violence. 
Its violent actions committed in the context of a political conflict are sanctioned 
by lawfulness (and are at times portrayed as anti-crime operations). It may be 
difficult to find a balance between the exercise of the right to participate through 
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protest and the obligation to respect such a right. More importantly, if a state 
has to resort to violence in the context of a political conflict, then other factions 
within the conflict are bound in response to employ what may be called 
"illegitimate" political violence. However, irrespective of whether the political 
violence is seen as legitimate or illegitimate, when such violence exceeds what 
is conventionally thought to be acceptable, then serious concerns are raised. 
In this regard, attention must be paid to the nature of the violence and the 
crimes committed as part of it; the scale of the victimisation; the systematic 
nature of the perpetration; and especially the motives underlying the 
perpetration. These issues may indicate whether or not serious crimes in 
international law have been committed. In Cameroon, however, this question 
has been answered: crimes against humanity have been committed. The 
seriousness of the crimes, based on the scale of the victimisation, the assault 
on the rights and freedoms of the people, and the degree of the woundedness 
suffered by the victims, have made Cameroon a conflict society in dire need of 
the institution of justice as a vehicle to bring about a fresh start. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Agbor "Reflection on the Phrase 'Widespread or Systematic'" 
Agbor AA "A Reflection on the Phrase 'Widespread or Systematic' as Part of 
the Definition of Crimes Against Humanity" in Jalloh CC and Elias O (eds) 
Shielding Humanity: Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Abdul G 
Koroma (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2015) 352-378 
Agbor 2017 PELJ 
Agbor AA "Pursuing the Right to an Effective Remedy for Human Rights 
Violation(s) in Cameroon: The Need for Legislative Reform" 2017 PELJ 1-20 
Aolin 2006 Colum J Gender & L 
Aolin FN "Political Violence and Gender During Times of Transition" 2006 
Colum J Gender & L 829-849 
Brandt and Reyna 2010 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 
Brandt MJ and Reyna C "The Role of Prejudice and the Need for Closure in 
Religious Fundamentalism" 2010 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 715-725 
Cassese International Law 
Cassese A International Law 2nd ed (Oxford University Press Oxford 2005) 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  25 
Cassese, Gaeta and Jones Rome Statute 
Cassese A, Gaeta P and Jones JRWD The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press Oxford 2002) 
Correa 1991-1992 Notre Dame L Rev 
Correa J "Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case after 
Dictatorship" 1991-1992 Notre Dame L Rev 1455-1485 
Dumouchel 2012 Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 
Dumouchel P "Political Violence and Democracy" 2012 Ritsumeikan Studies 
in Language and Culture 117-123 
Dwyer "Reconciliation for Realists" 
Dwyer S "Reconciliation for Realists" in Prager CAL and Govier T (eds) 
Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts (Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press Waterloo 2003) 91-110 
Emerson and Hartman 2006 Annu Rev Sociol 
Emerson MO and D Hartman D "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism" 2006 
Annu Rev Sociol 127-144 
Fombad "Mass Media and Democratisation in Africa" 
Fombad CM "The Mass Media and Democratisation in Africa: Lessons from 
Cameroon" in Mbaku JM and Ihonvbere JO (eds) The Transition to Democratic 
Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle (Praeger Westport 2003) 221-
248 
Goldstone "Fifty Years after Nuremberg" 
Goldstone RJ "Fifty Years after Nuremberg: A New International Criminal 
Tribunal for Human Rights Criminals" in Jongman AJ (ed) Contemporary 
Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences (PIOOM Leiden 1996) 215-216 
Goldstone Healing Wounded People 
Goldstone RJ Healing Wounded People, Speech at the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum (27 January 1997) 
Goldstone 1996 NYU J Int'l Law & Pol 
Goldstone RJ "Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals" 1996 NYU J Int'l Law & Pol 485-501 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  26 
Govier "What is Acknowledgment and Why is it Important?" 
Govier T "What is Acknowledgment and Why is it Important?" in Prager CAL 
and Govier T (eds) Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts (Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press Waterloo 2003) 63-89 
Hansen Political Violence in Kenya 
Hansen TO Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses, and 
a Framework for Discussing Preventive Action (Institute for Security Studies 
Pretoria 2009) 
Hibbs Mass Political Violence 
DA Hibbs Jr Mass Political Violence: A Cross-national Causal Analysis (Wiley 
New York 1973) 
Hiratsuka 2012 Educational Studies 
Hiratsuka H "Analysing the Psychological Dimension of Political Violence in 
Modern Civil Conflicts" 2012 Educational Studies 91-99 
Hunsberger 1995 J Soc Issues 
Hunsberger B "Religion and Prejudice: The Role of Religious Fundamentalism, 
Quest, and Right‐wing Authoritarianism" 1995 J Soc Issues 113-129 
Ignatieff 1996 Index on Censorship 
Ignatieff M "Articles of Faith" 1996 Index on Censorship 110-122 
International Crisis Group Cameroon 
International Crisis Group Cameroon: Fragile State? (Brussels International 
Crisis Group 2010) 
Jackson Report to the President 
Jackson RH Report to the President from Justice Robert H Jackson, Chief of 
Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, 
October 7, 1946, quoted in 1955 AJIL 44, 49 
Jenkins "Amnesty for Gross Violations of Human Rights" 
Jenkins C "Amnesty for Gross Violations of Human Rights in South Africa: A 
Better Way of Dealing with the Past?" in Edge I (ed) Comparative Law in Global 
Perspective: Essays in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding 
of the SOAS Law Department (Transnational Ardsley 2001) 19-20 
Konings "Post-colonial State and Economic and Political Reforms" 
Konings PJJ "The Post-colonial State and Economic and Political Reforms in 
Cameroon" in Fernández Jilberto AE and Mommen A (eds) Liberalisation in 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  27 
the Developing World – Institutional and Economic Change in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia (Routledge London 1996) 244-265 
Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997 J Mod Afr Stud 
Konings P and Nyamnjoh FB "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon" 1997 J 
Mod Afr Stud 207-229 
Konings and Nyamnjoh 2000 African Anthropologist 
Konings P and Nyamnjoh FB "Construction and Deconstruction: Anglophones 
or Autochtones?" 2000 African Anthropologist 5-32 
Konings and Nyamnjoh Negotiating an Anglophone Identity 
Konings P and Nyamnjoh FB (eds) Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A 
Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon (Brill 
Leiden 2003) 
Konings and Nyamnjoh "Paul Biya and the 'Anglophone Problem'" 
Konings P and Nyamnjoh FB "Paul Biya and the 'Anglophone Problem' in 
Cameroon" in Mbaku JM and Takougang J (eds) The Leadership Challenge in 
Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya (Africa World Press Trenton 2004) 191-234 
Laplante 2009 Va J Int'l L 
Laplante LJ "Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional 
Justice Schemes" 2009 Va J Int'l L 915-984 
Luban 2004 Yale J Int'l L 
Luban D "A Theory of Crimes against Humanity" 2004 Yale J Int'l L 85-167 
Marchetti and Tocci 2009 Global Change, Peace & Security 
Marchetti R and Tocci N "Conflict Society: Understanding the Role of Civil 
Society in Conflict" 2009 Global Change, Peace & Security 201-217 
McEvoy 2007 J Law Soc 
McEvoy K "Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of 
Transitional Justice" 2007 J Law Soc 411-440 
Meadow 2009 Marq L Rev 
Meadow RG "Political Violence and the Media" 2009 Marq L Rev 231-240 
Mendez 2001 Ethics & Int'l Affairs 
Mendez J "National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the 
International Criminal Court" 2001 Ethics & Int'l Affairs 25-44 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  28 
Mettraux International Crimes 
Mettraux G International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford University 
Press Oxford 2005) 
Mobekk "Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Societies" 
Mobekk E "Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Societies: Approaches to 
Reconciliation" in Ebnother A and Fluri P (eds) After Intervention: Public 
Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies - From Intervention to 
Sustainable Local Ownership (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces Geneva 2005) 261-292 
Moser and Clark Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? 
Moser C and Clark F Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gendered Armed 
Conflict and Political Violence (Zed Books London 2001) 
Obura "Duty to Prosecute International Crimes" 
Obura K "Duty to Prosecute International Crimes under International Law" in 
Murungu C and Biegon J (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa 
(PULP Pretoria 2011) 11-31 
Orentlicher 2007 IJTJ 
Orentlicher DF "'Settling Accounts' Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with 
Local Agency" 2007 IJTJ 10-22 
Quinn Reconcilliation(s) 
Quinn JR (ed) Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Societies 
(McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal 2009) 
Rios 2004 Language, Literacy, & Culture Review 
Rios CD-L "Understanding Political Violence" 2004 Language, Literacy, & 
Culture Review 29-43 
Scharf and Williams 2003 Case W Res J Int'l L 
Scharf MP and Williams PR "Functions of Justice and Anti-justice in the Peace-
building Process" 2003 Case W Res J Int'l L 161-190 
Simpson, Mokwena and Segal 1991 S Afr Hum Rts Yrbk 
Simpson G, Mokwena S and Segal L "Political Violence" 1991 S Afr Hum Rts 
Yrbk 193-219 
Takougang and Krieger African State and Society 
Takougang J and Krieger M African State and Society in the 1990s: 
Cameroon's Political Crossroads (Westview Boulder 1998) 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  29 
Teitel 2003 Harv Hum Rts J 
Teitel RG "Transitional Justice Genealogy" 2003 Harv Hum Rts J 69-94 
Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute 
Triffterer O Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article 2nd ed (Hart Oxford 2008) 
Vulliamy 1998 Int Aff 
Vulliamy Ed "Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement" 1998 Int Aff 73-92 
Walzer Just and Unjust Wars 
Walzer M Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(Basic Books New York 1992) 
Case law 
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač & Zoran Vuković v The Prosecutor Case 
No IT-96-23 & 23/1-T Appeals Chamber of 12 June 2002 
The Prosecutor v Alfred Musema Case No ICTR-96-13-T Trial Chamber I of 
27 January 2000 
The Prosecutor v Clement Kayishemba and Obed Ruzindana Case No ICTR-
95-1-T Trial Chamber I of 21 May 1999 
The Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač & Zoran Vuković Case 
No IT-96-23-T & 23/1-T Trial Chamber I of 22 February 2001 
The Prosecutor v George Rutaganda Case No ICTR-96-3-T Trial Chamber I 
of 6 December 1999 
The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu Case No ICTR-96-4-T Trial Chamber I 
of 2 September 1998 
The Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza Case No ICTR-97-20-T Trial Chamber III 
of 15 May 2003 
Legislation 
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 1972 
Law Enabling the Formation of Political Parties, Law No 90/056 of 19 
December 1990 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  30 
Law on Freedom of Mass Communication, Law No 90/052 of 19 December 
1990 (MC Law of 1990) 
International instruments 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) 
African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (2000) 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for 
Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law UN 
GAR A/RES/60/147 (2006) 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (1984) 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950) 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (1969) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
Yugoslav Tribunal Joint Statement by the President and the Prosecutor UN 
Doc CC/P10/027-E (1995) 
Internet sources 
Amnesty International 2017-2018 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries 
/africa/cameroon/report-cameroon 
Amnesty International 2017-2018 Cameroon https://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
countries/africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/ accessed 31 March 2018 
Carsten 2018 https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1F01P3-OZATP 
Carsten P 2018 At least 15,000 Cameroonian Refugees Flee to Nigeria Amid 
Crackdown https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1F01P3-OZATP 
accessed 9 April 2018 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  31 
Dahir 2018 https://qz.com/1179202/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-
threatening-to-spin-out-of-control/ 
Dahir AL 2018 Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis is Threatening to Spin out of 
Control https://qz.com/1179202/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-threatening-
to-spin-out-of-control/ accessed 9 April 2018 
Kindzeka 2017 http://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-troops-deployed-ahead-of-
anglophone-independence-declaration/a-40751054 
Kindzeka M Cameroon: Troops Deployed Ahead of Anglophone 
Independence Declaration http://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-troops-deployed-
ahead-of-anglophone-independence-declaration/a-40751054 accessed 9 
April 2018 
Shaban 2017 http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/17/upsurge-of-violence-in-
cameroon-s-anglophone-crisis-worries-un/ 
Shaban ARA 2017 Upsurge of Violence in Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis 
Worries UN http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/17/upsurge-of-violence-in-
cameroon-s-anglophone-crisis-worries-un/ accessed 9 April 2018 
Shaban 2018 http://www.africanews.com/2018/03/31/condition-of-
cameroonian-refugees-in-nigeria-worries-top-unhcr-official/ 
Shaban ARA 2018 Condition of Cameroonian Refugees in Nigeria Worries 
Top UNHCR Official http://www.africanews.com/2018/03/31/condition-of-
cameroonian-refugees-in-nigeria-worries-top-unhcr-official/ accessed 9 April 
2018 
Sixtus 2017 https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/12/04/cameroon-
government-declares-war-secessionist-rebels 
Sixtus M 2017 Cameroon Government 'Declares War' on Secessionist Rebels 
https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/12/04/cameroon-government-
declares-war-secessionist-rebels accessed 9 April 2018 
US Department of State 2016 https://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organisation/265446.pdf 
US Department of State 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
2016 – Cameroon https://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/265446.pdf 
accessed 31 March 2018 
AA AGBOR & EE NJIEASSAM  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  32 
List of Abbreviations 
AJIL American Journal of International Law 
Annu Rev Sociol Annual Review of Sociology 
BMM Brigade Mobile Mixte 
BIR Batallion d'Intervention Rapide 
Case W Res J Int'l L Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law 
Colum J Gender & L Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Ethics & Int'l Affairs Ethics and International Affairs 
Harv Hum Rts J Harvard Human Rights Journal 
ICC International Criminal Court 
IJTJ International Journal of Transitional Justice 
Int Aff International Affairs 
J Law Soc Journal of Law and Society 
J Mod Afr Stud Journal of Modern African Studies 
J Soc Issues Journal of Social Issues 
Marq L Rev Marquette Law Review 
Notre Dame L Rev Notre Dame Law Review 
PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
Pers Soc Psychol Bull Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
NYU J Int'l Law & Pol New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 
S Afr Hum Rts Yrbk South African Human Rights Yearbook 
Va J Int'l L Virginia Journal of International Law 
Yale J Int'l L Yale Journal of International Law 
 
